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This article does not claim to be an exhaustive study of all aspects of the
genesis, growth, expansion and constraints in the development of Addis
Ababa University as an academic and public institution or of those of its
constituent units1. Nor is it a review of its complex relations with the
imperial, military/socialist and current regimes, and with the wider society.
It is rather a brief account of selected aspects of the change and continuity
in the history of the oldest and leading institution of higher learning in
Ethiopia as perceived, understood and interpreted by one who has been
associated with it for a quarter of a century. The views and interpretations
expressed, the conclusions drawn, and the suggestions made, in the study
should therefore be seen from the perspective of the writer’s own perception
and professional experience, and not from that of either the institution itself
or its constituents. Needless to say, there are not only gaps in the narrative
account but also a number of crucial themes and issues, other than those
briefly discussed in the paper, that deserve deeper scrutiny and a more criti-
cal analysis in the light of official and private documentary evidence and
oral sources. The impact of the University leadership and administration,
the academic staff members and students, both individually and collectively,
and that of the wider national and international contexts, upon the course
* An earlier version of this paper was presented to a graduate seminar held at the
Centre d’études africaines of the École des hautes études en science sociales in
Paris on 16 May 2003. References to the secondary literature were incorporated
subsequently. I am grateful to EHESS for its generous financial support and Drs.
José Kagabo and Éloi Ficquet for their warm hospitality.
1. A much more complete account of higher education and the institutional history
of AAU was written by Professor Taddesse Tamrat (formerly a senior member
of the teaching staff of the Department of History, Director of the IES and Dean
of the College of Social Sciences) on the occasion of the University’s 50th anni-
versary that was celebrated in 2000. The work is in the process of being consid-
ered for publication in the US (personal communication from Professor Taddesse,
3 September 2003). Professor BAHRU (2002: 211) hopes to write a book on the
Ethiopian student movement as a sequel to his study of the reformist intellectuals.
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of the evolution and development of higher education in Ethiopia in general
and the AAU in particular is a subject worthy of a separate study. Periodic
and critical reviews and assessments of the successes and failures of the
University can contribute to a better understanding of the problems and
challenges that it has faced, and of the responses it has made, as well as
to an appreciation of its successes and a critical evaluation of its constraints
and failures during the course of the fifty-three years of its existence.
Foundation and Early Development
The University College of Addis Ababa (UCAA) was founded in 1950 under
the auspices, and on the initiative, of the imperial government, and in collab-
oration with, Canadian Jesuit educators who were entrusted with the respon-
sibility of administering it for almost a decade. In 1962 it was renamed
the Haile Sellassie I University (HSIU) and then, unofficially, the National
University (NU) during the brief period of transition between the collapse
of the imperial regime and the consolidation of the military junta (1974-
1975). Finally, it acquired its present designation, Addis Ababa University
(AAU), in 1975-1976, twenty-five years after its establishment.
UCAA’s first administrators were a Canadian Jesuit, Lucien Matte, and
an American, Harold W. Bentley (1961-1962). Subsequently, a policy of
Ethiopianization led to the appointment of Lej (later Dajjāzmāch) Kāsā
Walda Māryām (1962-1969) (an Oromo of Wallaggā and sometime provin-
cial governor who later married a princess) as the first president. (The
Chancellor was until 1974 the Emperor himself). The presidency was suc-
cessively held by Aklilu Habtē (1969-1974), Tāyyē Gullilāt (1974-1977),
Duri Muhammad (who served for two terms: 1977-1985, 1991-1995), Abiy
Kifla (1985-1991), Alamāyyahu Tafarrā (the first-ever elected executive)
(1992-1993), Mogasē Ashannāfi (1995-2000), Eshatu Wanchaqqo (also
elected) (2001-2002), and Andreas Esheté, the current incumbent. All were
(except Alamāyyahu and Eshatu) government appointees (and all from the
University). The fact that most came from the Faculties of Science and
Engineering in rapid succession has recently aroused some resentment.
From 1969 to 1974 the Board of Governors nominated the president, but
after the revolution, it was the Council for Higher Education, which assumed
that function (Fisseha 1984: 44). While the Institute Directors and Faculty/
College Deans are appointed by the Senate on the recommendation of the
Academic Vice-President, Department Chairmen are elected by the teaching
staff and endorsed by the Academic Commission of the Faculty/College.
Over the last two years a policy of overhauling the administrative structure,
the setting up of a university-wide website, and the provision of computers
for use by the teaching staff was launched but was overshadowed by the
events leading to the instalment of a new management in early 2003.
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Originally the UCAA had its main campus at Arat Kilo (the Quartier Latin
of Addis Ababa), not far from Emperor Menilek’s palace, the parliament,
the Ministry of Education, and a big slum area to the southeast. (This was,
of course, half a century before the district was graced by the recently-
constructed luxury hotel, Sheraton Addis, the flagship of MIDROC, the con-
glomerate owned and managed by Shaykh Muhammad Husayn al-‘Amūdı̄,
the flamboyant and philanthropic Saudi investor of Hadramı̄/Ethiopian ori-
gin, who received an honorary doctorate from the University in late July
2003). In 1961 the main campus moved to Siddist Kilo into Emperor Haile
Sellassie I’s Gannata Le’ul (Princely Paradise) palace. The emperor
“donated” the sprawling compound to serve as the main university campus
and the site of the central administration offices, the social sciences (the
Faculty of Arts until 1979), education and law faculties, the Institute of
Ethiopian Studies (IES), the Institute of Language Studies (ILS), and the
Kennedy Library.
It has been asserted that the emperor’s decision was not an act of royal
generosity and benevolence2 but was inspired by a desire to obliterate from
his consciousness the haunting memory and ghost (Hailu 1993: 3) of the
massacre of members of the aristocracy that took place in what was then
called the Green Salon (or Rās Makonnen Hall) (now the main reading
room of the IES Library) (Addis Ababa University 1980: 12). The bloody
act was committed in a moment of desperation by the leaders of the 1960
abortive coup d’etat who belonged to the elite Imperial Bodyguard, and was
the forerunner of the summary execution of sixty members of the royalty
and aristocracy by the military government in 1974. The emperor was, at
the time of the coup, on an official visit to Brazil.
According to Trudeau (1968: 55-56): “Classes began at the University
College of Addis Ababa on December 11, 1950. It was a humble begin-
ning. There was a staff of nine teachers, the principal included. There
were seventy-one students, all men...” The first decade of its existence
lasting from 1950 to 1960 can be described as a period of slow but steady
growth in terms of infrastructure. In 1961 it had about 900 students and
100 academic staff members. (Twenty years later the number of students
had risen to 11,000 [including fee-paying ones attending evening classes]
and that of the academic staff to 600). “By the end of the first decade of
its existence, Addis Abeba [Haile Sellassie I] University had grown to be
one of the largest universities in sub-Sahara[n] Africa in both enrolment
and diversity of educational programs” (Fisseha 1984: 1, 11). Its graduates
were largely recruited into the civil service and enjoyed a high social profile
2. As claimed by the emperor himself in a speech he made on the occasion of the
inauguration of the Haile Sellassie I University: “Today, We have dedicated Our
home... as a free gift to the nation...” in Haile Sellassie I University: A Blueprint
for Development (Addis Ababa, August 1970), 19 (typescript).
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and prestige. This was perhaps the only decade in the history of the institu-
tion when its students and staff were either apolitical or indifferent, neutral
and inactive, if not completely lacking in political consciousness3. It was
a period of paternalism and imperial patronage of higher education in the
country.
The Student Movement during the Imperial Era
The second decade (1960-1970), which was characterised by the rise of
student political activism and social critique, witnessed the coming and fail-
ure of the coup4, the decolonization of Africa (there were African students
on government scholarships5) and the rise of global student radicalism (for
example, in Paris in 1968). These internal and external events had a direct
and indirect impact upon the political and social outlook of university stu-
dents who now became vocal activists, articulate and intransigent, both in
and off campus6, having abandoned, as Amutabi pointed out while referring
to Kenyan university students, “...their ivory tower mentality” (Amutabi
2002: 161-163). As Addis noted: “The sixties were a decade crowded with
demonstrations, rallies, and active mobilisation of forces against both feu-
dalism and imperialism” (Addis 1975: 95). One of the factors that provided
a pretext for student unrest was paradoxically an incident that was not even
remotely connected to politics: a fashion show (Balsvik 1985: 213-233)
(held in 1968)7, promoting the values of Western culture, that aroused indig-
nation among students and staff, and led to a wave of anti-American protest
(against the Peace Corps (Teferra 1997: 57), the war in Vietnam and the
presence of an American military base/centre of communications in
Asmara), a distant echo of the military government’s anti-US stance in the
3. But see TEFERRA (1997: 57): “The student population...lacked political conscious-
ness in the fifties and early sixties...” Between 1957 and 1960 conferences were
held by students of the various colleges to establish a National Union of Students
(GREENFIELD 1965: 365). For a study of the relationship between university edu-
cation and politics, see BEYENE (1977).
4. For a brief discussion of the reaction of the students of UCAA to the coup, see
MARCUS (1999: 11-12); GREENFIELD (1965: 404-406); CLAPHAM (1968: 496);
TEKESTE (1990: 134, 150). On the growing students’ “propensity for political
action”, see MARKAKIS (1975: 189), and on the evolution of the movement in
the 1960s (ibid.: 358-360) and GILKES (1975: 248-250).
5. On the impact of the presence of African students, see GREENFIELD (1965: 366-
369).
6. For a pioneering study of the student movement, see BALSVIK (1985). Her most
recent work on the subject is BALSVIK (2003); see also HESS (1970: 164-177).
7. HESS (1970: 169) stressed the significance of the event thus: “The fashion show
crisis itself served to indicate that politically motivated students...had developed
the sophistication to turn an insignificant issue into a catalyst for the politics of
confrontation typical of student dissent movements throughout the world.”
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late seventies and throughout the eighties. As noted by an Ethiopian histor-
ian: “The Ethiopian Student Movement went through various phases of evol-
ution, starting as a cultural and intellectual forum of an elite and growing
into a mass revolutionary movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s”
(Bahru 2000b: 222, 2002: 211).
Thereafter, publications and leaflets containing articles critical of the
government and the university administration were openly and clandestinely
printed and distributed by leaders of the student movement on behalf of the
council (the University Students’ Union of Addis Ababa, USUAA, founded
in 1967). Long meetings were regularly held in the main campus at Siddist
Kilo (the Christmas/Dining Hall) where at first issues, such as the improve-
ment of amenities like the quality of food and better dormitories, and subse-
quently and increasingly broader national political, social and economic
issues, were thoroughly debated. Fisseha (1984: 23) made the remark that
“...the students have always been tolerant if the problems were related to
food, housing, and health”. Occasionally, these debates led to the bipolari-
zation of the student body between an active and vocal minority, holding
radical/leftist and uncompromising views, and a passive and not-so-politically
articulate majority. There were also divisions among the staff members
between those educated in the country and abroad or conflicts aggravated
by personal animosities, and ideological and ethnic differences (Ottaway
1978: 114-115). These internal contradictions were not reconciled peace-
fully. “Dissenting opinions were treated with intolerance” (Bahru 2000b:
226). The politically moderate and cautious students were dubbed “sabote-
urs” by the radical elements because the former failed to abide by the resolu-
tions, allegedly passed unanimously, calling for the boycott of classes and
the staging of sit-in strikes and street demonstrations. Some also fell under
the suspicion of being agents of university officials, who were invariably
identified with the government, or in the pay of the latter. The climax of
all this in-campus flurry of activities and protest campaigns were the street
marches and demonstrations during which students shouted slogans like
“Down with the government!” “Land to the tiller” and chanted songs in
which they glorified the achievements of Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse-tung and
Che Guevara in nationalist and revolutionary movements, one of which ran
as follows: “Fānno tasamārā, fānno tasamārā, enda Ho Chi Minh enda Che
Guevara!” [“Oh, guerrillas, take to the bush! Oh, guerrillas, take to the bush
like Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara!”] This was the decade
of pamphleteering and sloganeering, perhaps surpassed only by the slogan-
mongering of the Darg period that was more inflammatory, abusive and
laudatory: “Down with feudalism, capitalism and imperialism! Motherland
or Death! Long live international proletarianism! Forward with the leadership
of Mengistu Hailemariam! La lutta continua!”
The late sixties and early seventies were also a period of ideologically-
informed discussions of political issues such as the national question with
reference to self-determination and secession, a timely subject connected to
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the armed struggle in Eritrea. “Marxism-Leninism was embraced as a creed
rather than as a system of thought to help interpret the Ethiopian reality.
Slogans came to be mistaken for theory” (Bahru 2000b: 226; Andargachew
1993: 29-30)8. There were many peaceful demonstrations that sometimes
degenerated into violent clashes between the students, on the one hand, and
regular army and police forces, on the other, often provoked by the latter
who entered the university campus to disperse students’ meetings and pre-
vent them from staging protest marches in the streets of the capital. This
inevitably led to mass and indiscriminate arrests and imprisonment—and
killing—of student activists like Wālalleñ Makonnen, shot dead in the
course of an attempted plane hijack, and Telāhun Gezāw, president of the
student union and brother-in-law of Prince Makonnen Haile Sellassie, who
was by all accounts murdered by government security agents on the night
of 28 December 19699. The government’s refusal to allow students to take
custody of the corpse of the slain activist became the cause célèbre for another
round of violent confrontation between the students and security forces, lead-
ing to the closure of the university. According to Andargachew (1993: 136):
“The events of December 1969 [following the murder of Telāhun]... indicated
to the students a change in government policy towards them: a change away
from a paternalistic approach by the King to a heavy-handed policy intended
to crush the movement.” After a lapse of days and sometimes weeks, the
government would announce an amnesty and the reopening of the university,
and students would gradually return to classes. Since the government con-
trolled the media, it had the decisive advantage of presenting its own version
of the causes for student unrest and of justifying to the public the ways
with which it handled the ensuing crisis. Students were accused of having
acted on instructions from some invisible domestic or foreign forces of sub-
version, and of posing a threat to the unity and security of the country.
Generally, the official view was that the movement, which it always referred
to as “student disturbances”, was instigated by a handful of students10.
This complex process of student protest and government repression,
characterised by a sequence of often predictable episodes11, became an
annual political ritual to which the ordinary residents of the city grew accus-
tomed and looked forward. As Clapham noted: “The years from then
[1960] until the revolution were punctuated by student strikes and demon-
strations, the occasional closure of the university or police invasion of the
8. On the ideological rift within the Ethiopian student movement, both abroad and
in the country, see ANDARGACHEW (1993: 137-155).
9. 10 December 1969, according to BERHANOU (1998: 209).
10. For a similar attitude, see AMUTABI (2002: 159). This was also noted by HESS
(1970: 171): “At first the government placed the blame for student agitation on
a handful of students allegedly duped by foreign agents...”
11. HESS (1970: 168): “Each spring since 1967 the student movement has challenged
the government; each year student demonstrations have increased in their out-
spoken criticism of the government.”
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campus, and other indications of dissent” (Clapham 1988: 33). The cumu-
lative effect of this overt challenge to, and defiance of, the imperial order
was the political awakening of the general public and high-school students
of Addis Ababa, and those of the provincial towns, who took a keen interest
in, and sympathised and fraternized with, the growing militancy of the stu-
dents. In the public mind the good intentions and peaceful posture of the
students stood out in sharp contrast to the aggressiveness, ruthless repression
and brutality of the police and security forces. Whenever there were no
student protests against deteriorating economic conditions and injustice,
people often asked the following questions: “What has happened to univer-
sity students? Have they been bought off by the government? Have they
given up the struggle?” This was because they looked up to the students
as the natural defenders of their rights and freedom. It is thus plausible
to argue that the students articulated the grievances and aspirations of the
masses, and that the student movement was, in the absence of political
parties, the sole outlet for the discontent of the people.
Students’ activism was sometimes, however, dependent on the level of
their academic progress in the university. The degree of their militancy
was generally inversely proportional to the length of their stay in campus.
First-year students were potentially the most active and formed the main
constituency of the union leaders, especially during election campaigns.
They were liable to be influenced easily by their rhetoric and charisma,
although this was tempered by the fear of “Christmas graduation”, a
euphemism for end-of-semester dismissal. Subsequent to their promotion
to the senior classes at which point they were absorbed by the chores of
academia (regular attendance of lectures, writing of term papers, completion
of reading assignments, etc.), their enthusiasm for political activism dimin-
ished progressively. Those in their final year of studies (except the union
leaders) were eager to graduate and get into life outside of the campus, and
since participation in political activities was an impediment to employment
opportunities and career advancement, most tended to avoid direct involve-
ment in, and be identified with, the whole student movement.
The first half of the third decade—the 1970s—marked the climax of
the student movement in terms of ideological focus (a strong commitment
to, and belief in, Marxism and Leninism with increasingly Stalinist and
Maoist overtones) and strategic option (adoption of popular armed strug-
gle). As rightly argued by Bahru (2002: 211), the student movement can
be said to have marked a radical departure from the reformist tradition of
political opposition espoused by the Ethiopian intellectuals of the early
twentieth century12 in terms of its ideological content, breadth of vision,
appeal to wider sections of society, and favourable international context in
which it emerged and flourished.
12. BALSVIK (1994: 82) speaks of a reformist phase in the student movement in the
early 1960s. She argues that only in 1965 did the movement assume its radical
character (p. 83).
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The Movement during the Darg Period
While the contribution of the student movement to the fall of the ancien
régime in 1974 was significant, although limited (Ottaway & Ottaway 1978:
35)13, it certainly played a decisive role in the radicalization and ideological
orientation of the revolution of which young army officers later claimed to
be the sole vanguards and leaders since they were the only corporate body
capable (by virtue of their possession of the instruments of coercion) of
setting the agenda for the future of the country14. The prevailing economic
and social malaise, aggravated by the famine and the global energy crisis,
and by the mutinies of army divisions stationed in sensitive regions (Boranā
[Sidāmo] in the south and Eritrea in the north) combined to provide the
complex backdrop to the revolutionary upsurge that finally swept away the
monarchy and its institutions.
Student support for the revolutionary changes assured the new regime
of the sympathy of a vocal constituency and gave it the time to consolidate
its power. However, no sooner had the students expressed their solidarity
than they began to challenge the military regime (the Darg) mainly on ideo-
logical grounds. They demanded the return of the soldiers to their barracks
and called for the establishment of a people’s government. This led to
strained and bitter relations between them. Inspired by the old student
demands, and in response to the long-standing grievances of the Ethiopian
peasantry, the military government introduced two radical and far-reaching
reforms: the dispossession of the landed gentry and distribution of confis-
cated lands among tenants, and the nationalization of urban real estate and
private financial institutions. The whole country was seized with revol-
utionary fervour, and the government and its allies launched a campaign
of vicious and arbitrary attacks on individuals, especially intellectuals, the
propertied classes and former officials, who were branded as counter-
revolutionaries or allies of opposition movements or agents of Western
imperialism.
In 1974-1975 the government publicly announced the imminent imple-
mentation of the Development through Cooperation Campaign (zamachā),
ostensibly designed to enable students to teach and politicize the peasants
but widely seen as a politically-motivated ruse to get them out of the capital
and the provincial towns, their principal centres of political agitation against
the regime (Teferra 1997: 150; Markakis & Nega 1986: 133; Balsvik 1994:
94). (This is comparable to the resettlement programme of the 1980s that
involved the forced transfer of people from the northern provinces which
were not only the scenes of heavy fighting between government forces and
13. But BALSVIK (1985: xiii) holds a different view: “They [university students] beca-
me...a critical factor in the overthrow of the Haile Sellassie regime.” See also
FISSEHA (1984: 14).
14. On the contrary, BALSVIK (1994: 79) has argued that “...students were the only
group whose behaviour conformed to an institutionalized pattern”.
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those of insurgency movements in Eritrea and Tegrāy, but also recruiting
grounds for the latter).
The land reform proclamation was implemented primarily through the
efforts of the students and teachers of AAU, and those of senior secondary
schools, often at great cost to their lives. The university and all schools
were closed for two solid years, thus arresting the process of the further
development and expansion of higher education and leading to “...loss of
the human, material, and financial resources that it [the university] had been
accumulating during the previous decade” (Fisseha 1984: 39), and to the
delay in the graduation of students, without any rewards or compensation.
Those who had refused to take part in the campaign and held jobs during
the campaign actually rejoined the schools and the university together with
those who had loyally carried out their assignments, the only consolation
for the latter being certificates which had absolutely no material or even
nominal value.
Harassed by disgruntled and armed landlords, frustrated by the failure
of local authorities to protect them, and inspired by the subversive ideas
of the emergent insurgency movements, some of the participants of the zam-
achā joined either urban-based opposition groups or those operating in the
countryside. This forced the government to suspend the campaign and to
terrorize the returnees and the civilian population until 1977-1978 when the
war with Somalia broke out and the counter-insurgency offensives in Eritrea
were intensified in subsequent years, and civilians, including students, were
forcefully conscripted for military service.
For the student movement, the 1980s were a time of both political hiber-
nation and modest recovery from the repression of the second half of the
1970s. While a few members of the academic and administrative staff of
the University joined, or were recruited by, pro-government political groups
and later the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE), most abandoned active pol-
itical opposition owing to the trauma of the “Red Terror”—the murderous,
vindictive and ruthless campaign launched by the state against intellectuals
and other civilians as a revenge for the assassination, by squads of the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), of the executive members
of the urban neighbourhood associations (qabalēs), particularly the so-called
revolutionary guards or defence squads who were notorious for their unscru-
pulousness and swift administration of revolutionary justice against actual
or potential dissidents. The campaign (Dawit 1989: 9-11, 31-34; Markakis
& Nega 1986: 168-69) took the form of rounding up and shooting of thous-
ands of people who were suspected of being sympathetic to, or of having
read the literature produced by, that organization which was the strongest
armed civilian opposition group at the time.
University staff and students had become by this time politically impo-
tent, the former after the banning of the Ethiopian University Teachers’
Association. This was partly because of the burden of Marxist-Leninist
literature that had to be incorporated into the curriculum and to be mastered
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and presented to a largely passive audience forced to attend weekly political
discussion forums, partly because of fear of ruthless counter-measures, and
partly because of heavy teaching loads and the arduous task of revising the
curriculum in order to bring it in line with the state ideology—all of which
left the staff with little or no time to engage in political protests. They
also faced acute economic hardships due to a low salary scale, progressive
taxation on income, the rising cost of living, and the intractable shortage
of housing (the first and last problems have been partially dealt with recently
through a salary adjustment scheme and a monthly housing allowance).
Perhaps the most remarkable achievement of AAU during the trying dec-
ade of the eighties was the successful launching (with impressive results)
of the post-graduate programme, both at the M.A./M.Sc. level in 1979 and
the Ph. D. in 1987, by a few departments (including that of history). This
went some way in partially solving the chronic problem of the shortage of
trained and qualified manpower. Paradoxically, however, it also led to a
brain drain (Dejene 2000: 1-19; Seyoum 1992: 27-46, 2000: 20-30; Solomon
2002: 52-55) that is common to all sub-Saharan African universities and
whose principal beneficiaries were the Western countries. As noted by two
African scholars (Nyamnjoh & Jua 2002: 15): “Thus the very Western coun-
tries that charged African states exorbitant rates to train their students now
benefited from the expertise of these young African intellectuals almost free
of charge.” Quite a large number of young faculty who were sent to Europe,
and particularly to the United States, for advanced studies never returned
home15. Consequently, the rate of staff attrition was so devastating that
some departments were left only with the chairpersons and some senior
academic staff members approaching the age of retirement, although their
contracts were kept renewed.
The Movement since 1991
The last decade of the twentieth century proved even more turbulent than
the earlier ones since it saw some revival of activism inspired by the trend
towards political pluralism and economic liberalism. In the early period
following the overthrow of the military dictatorship, the relations between
the University and the new government were characterised by a great deal
of uncertainty and ambivalence. Theoretically, there was ample scope for
mutual understanding and smooth encounter between some of the academic
staff of the University and the political leadership owing to a shared experi-
ence as students and dissidents inspired by radical ideologies. However,
there was a perception held by the latter that the University had identified
15. “Between 1980 and 1990 West Africa overtook North Africa [in the number of
students in the US], although Egypt remained in first place, followed by Nigeria
and Ethiopia...” (Zeleza 2002: 12).
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itself too closely with the Darg (especially during its last years of rule when
some of the staff had been recruited as members of the WPE) and would
therefore be potentially disloyal to the regime. In 1990-1991 University
students responded favourably to the government’s call for volunteers to
fight on the side of the army against the forces of the insurgency movements
(including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, TPLF) advancing towards
the capital. A second factor for the cool relations between the University
and the state was perhaps the tactlessness with which the latter articulated
its attitudes towards, and views on, the University and its future role by
combining a mild threat with vituperative language: the University was des-
cribed as a fortress of elitist arrogance. Relations were normalized after
a brief spell of sharp reprimand, conducted through the media, because the
need for good governance and legitimising and exercising political power
required tolerance of, and the stabilization of relations with, an important
constituency represented by the University. However, circumstances and
conditions for the reactivation of the undercurrent of tension between the
academic institution and the political establishment were not lacking. There
were several student demonstrations against some aspects of the new gov-
ernment’s ethnically-based politics and policies (Konings 2002: 179-204),
although, as Merera (2002: 37) rightly put it: “The general discourse on
the politics of ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia” originated from the
national question that was first raised and analysed by the Ethiopian student
movement in the late sixties and seventies.
On 4 January 1993 government forces clashed with University students16
demonstrating against the proposed visit to Eritrea of the UN Secretary-
General prior to the referendum and its eventual independence17. This led
to the arrest of students and the temporary closure of the University, remi-
niscent of the early seventies. Also in the same year a large number of
staff (42) were summarily fired, although for most of them, their sudden
discharge turned out to be a blessing in disguise (and a source of envy for
those who remained) since they ended up being employed abroad or by
international non-governmental organizations at salaries which reputedly
made a mockery of the meagre pay which they used to receive as univer-
sity employees18.
16. The clashes were reported in Ethiopian Herald of 5, 13, 16, 19 January and 2,
3 February 1993.
17. For a discussion of the factors that might have influenced the students’ position
on Eritrea, see MELAKOU (1994: 73-75).
18. A 1997 comparative survey of the salaries of university academic staff of six
sub-Saharan African countries placed Ethiopia third after South Africa and
Zimbabwe with a per annum salary of US $6,000 for a professor: SAKO (2002:
28). By contrast those of the University of Liberia were at the lowest rung of
the salary scale: “The University of Liberia’s annual salary for a university pro-
fessor ($856) is only 37.8 percent of a Ghanaian professor’s salary, 18.9 percent
of a Kenyan professor’s, 5.6 percent of a Zimbabwean professor, and 4.5 percent
of a South African professor’s salary” (BARCLAY 2002: 44).
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In March 1997 a large number of Amhara students of the University
protested against the motives for, and consequences of, the redistribution
of land in the Amhara regional state19, and submitted a petition to the prime
minister’s office; the demonstration was dispersed by riot police. It is inter-
esting to note the following comment: “A spokesman of the [police] com-
mission said it is surprising to see students go against the interest of farmers
as opposed to the tradition of the student movement which staunchly fought
raising high the motto ‘Land to the Tiller’”20.
On 10 April 2001 students handed in a written petition to the University
administration to allow them to have their own independent press and union,
and demanding the removal of security forces from the campus. When no
response came from the University administration, they went on strike.
The subsequent raiding of the campus by government forces, without the
authorization of the highest state officials, was denounced by the University
president and the Minister of Education. After the failure of the attempts
at a negotiated settlement of the dispute, the conflict spilled over into central
Addis Ababa resulting in the looting by the city’s unemployed youths instead
of shops and the sacking of government buildings. When the University
was closed, many students withdrew and were readmitted after a year21.
Recent Developments
The establishment of regional colleges and universities (about half a dozen
in all), although done rather hastily and without proper feasibility studies
and adequate infrastructure and funding, can be considered as a major posi-
tive step taken by the current government. However, this has not yet eased
the pressure and burden on AAU. The proliferation of private colleges has
had, however, the effect of attracting some of the younger staff members
of AAU since the new colleges offered better pay, leading to what one can
call an ‘internal brain drain.
In 2002-2003 the number of the academic staff members of the University
was 802 (38 professors, 131 associate professors, 212 assistant professors,
313 lecturers, 78 assistant lecturers and 35 graduate assistants). There were
23,060 students enrolled in the under-graduate regular day and evening, and
in the post-graduate, programmes. Over the period of 22 years since
198122, the number of students has more than doubled (with, however, no
significant improvement and expansion of facilities necessary to accommo-
date them), whereas that of the academic staff has risen by a mere 200, a
cogent demonstration of the impact of the brain drain and the urgency of
not only retaining the existing staff members but also of recruiting new ones.
19. Ethiopian Herald, 22, 25 and 27 March 1997 (EGE 2002: 71-86).
20. Ethiopian Herald, 22, March 1997: 2.
21. Ethiopian Herald, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 April 2001.
22. See above.
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There are several research institutes that are on a par with any other in
Africa and indeed in the rest of the world. The major ones are the following:
1. The IES, with its rich library housing the largest collection in the
world of books, periodicals, theses and archival material on microfilms relat-
ing to Ethiopia and the Horn, and a growing ethnographic museum. Estab-
lished in 1963, it has been the premier centre of research and documentation
in and on Ethiopia. It has hosted four of the fifteen international conferen-
ces of Ethiopian studies; the eleventh was held a week or so before the fall
of the Darg in 1991, a tribute to both the perseverance of the organizers
and the courage of the foreign participants. The IES has been publishing
the Journal of Ethiopian Studies for several decades now and grants permits
to researchers. Its library must extend its working days and opening hours
to enable the academic staff, senior students, the general public and foreign
researchers to have more access to books and journals.
2. The Institute of Development Research (IDR), founded in 1972. It
has been conducting and promoting developmental research, teaching and
researching on the social sciences with particular emphasis on rural develop-
ment. Its main aims are: conducting a multi-disciplinary socio-economic
research, exchange and disseminate research findings, develop teaching mat-
erials, contribute to human resources development through training, and pro-
vide consultancy services. It has a rich documentation centre and publishes
the Ethiopian Journal of Development Research.
3. The Institute of Pathobiology (IBP), established in 1966. The main
objectives of IBP are, among other things, conducting research in applied
biological and/or biomedical as well as animal health and pathological scien-
ces, and providing training in the fields of applied biology to science and
medical students, and to research assistants.
4. The Institute of Educational Research (IER), originally set up in
1968, runs several educational programmes and provides services including
research, consultancies, testing and conferences. It publishes the Ethiopian
Journal of Education. The IER has units for Research Projects and Training;
Publications, Public Relations and Dissemination; Tests and Measurements
Services; and a Pedagogical Centre for Higher Education.
Constraints23
The major ones are the following:
1. The failure to reinstitute the charter (originally granted in 1954) that
was revoked when the Darg came to power, and the granting of administrative
and financial autonomy. The Ministry of Finance allocates the University’s
annual budget but is also in charge of its accounts, and this does not admit
of any discretion and flexibility. Although the budget has been steadily
23. For a brief discussion see BAHRU (2000a) and WEIKER (1962).
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increasing (except for the years 1974-1976), it has not been sufficient to
cover the cost of new equipment and provide funding for staff and student
research, and to meet the ever-increasing demand for the purchase and
acquisition of books and academic journals.
2. The pace of infrastructural improvement and expansion (new
classrooms and offices), especially in the main campus, has been too slow
to cope with the phenomenal increase in the number of both under- and
post-graduate students. There is a serious shortage of resources for conting-
encies. For example, the University found itself completely helpless in the
face of the recent (March-July 2003) partial disruption of electricity that
affected the country. Every Tuesday24 was a black day both literally and
figuratively: the computers were down, evening classes had to be cancelled
or rearranged, and some of the administrative and secretarial staff took the
day off as an unofficial holiday, but for the teaching staff who had classes
in the evening, it meant a desperate, and often unsuccessful, search for time
and extra rooms to give makeup classes because the courses had to be cov-
ered by hook or crook. The lack of alternative sources of power, such as
a generator, further aggravated the problem that persisted until mid-July
when the supply of electricity was fully restored.
3. Occasional conflicts and misunderstanding between students/academic
staff, and the university administration and the government, should be resol-
ved through negotiations—away from confrontation to a dialogue and
constructive engagement, and from mutual suspicion to genuine trust or
what Kasozi called “positive state intervention” or “benevolent influence”
(Kasozi 2002: 133). The active participation of the university community
in national affairs, and in policy formulation and implementation, should
be sought and encouraged by organizing workshops to discuss issues affect-
ing the society in order to reach a consensus like the initiative taken by
the government in the summer of 2002 (a three-week seminar attended by
all academic staff members and presided over by the Prime Minister, fully
televised, and characterised by an open and free exchange of ideas and
views).
4. The overhauling of the system of incentives and staff remuneration
and promotion policy (Sako 2002: 28), and of evaluation of performance,
provision of housing and other benefits25, revision of the retirement and
pension schemes to enable the staff to render longer services, drastic reduc-
tion in the teaching loads so that there is more time (even if there is not
much funding) for research and publication—all these measures are long
overdue and need to be addressed urgently and solutions sought without
any further delay.
24. Beginning from the third week of May 2003, the blackout was briefly extended
to include Friday as well.
25. A proposal for raising the salary scale and introducing a benefit scheme for the
staff was made as early as 1970 by John Summerskill, planning officer of the
University: see “A Blueprint for Development”, 5, 121.
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5. The restructuring of the university administration, the teaching
departments, research institutes and other units within the university system
should be done through prior consultation and discussion with the staff, not
by imposing a blueprint to be adopted within too short a time. There should
be a continuous and constructive dialogue based on genuine partnership
between the six stakeholders in higher education in the country: students,
academic staff, the administration, the government, the private sector and
the community at large.
The relations between the University administration and the teaching
staff should be motivated and inspired by a shared sense of responsibility,
transparency and accountability, and by a common objective: the training
and provision of highly-qualified manpower needed for national develop-
ment. The prevailing mode and pattern of relations between the two part-
ners should be reformed and replaced by one that is anchored on the
recognition of the value of the input and views of the teaching staff for the
formulation and practical application of both general policies and specific
guidelines. On the one hand, when, for instance, proposals for the revision
of, or change in, provisions of the legislation, or requests for funding, were
submitted to the University’s executive organs by the departments, after a
thorough discussion among the staff and by the members of the respective
academic commissions, it took ages before they received any response.
On the other, when the higher authorities transmitted instructions about new
rules, regulations and procedures, revision of curriculum or introduction of
new courses, or a massive increase in the intake of students for the graduate
programme, the departments were obliged to follow the instructions faith-
fully and implement the proposals within a period fixed by the authorities.
This aroused deep resentment among the staff—a resentment which found
no outlet because of the absence of an independent forum for articulating
critical ideas, the fear of administrative sanctions and dismissal, and the
risk that such reactions might be misconstrued as a cover for political insu-
bordination and protest. However, the blame for the unforeseen and/or
predicted adverse consequences arising from the order for the immediate
implementation of the new directives (expressed figuratively in the Amharic
phrase, surri bāngat, lit. compelling one to take off his trousers through
the neck) was invariably put on the departments or their members.
At this critical juncture in its history, when it is embarking on the enor-
mous task of introducing internal reforms, redefining its mission and build-
ing up a better image and profile in society, the University administration
cannot afford to take decisions and actions affecting the fate of the academic
community that might be construed as being prejudiced for or against one
or the other of its constituencies: the students and the staff. It must regulate
the relations between the two, and its own relations with them, in a manner
that does not reflect partisanship or a desire to gain temporary and strategic
advantages. It must strike a balance between its short—and long—term
priorities, needs and objectives, and those of the nation, and defend the
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University’s credibility, and honour and have trust in the integrity of the
staff. The continued loyalty and commitment of its staff depends not so
much on the opportunities, benefits and rewards it offers (and sometimes
withholds), nor on the length of service, but on the conducive working and
teaching environment that it creates and sustains. The resources (though
limited) and the competence for achieving this are readily available; the
goodwill and the determination remain to be seen.
6. The initiative for revising the curricula, and determining the teaching
and research capacity of departments, and the duration and conditions of
study and work, should come from the departments themselves, not be dic-
tated by others for reasons which are not usually explained sufficiently.
The objective of introducing innovations, reforms and plans for expansion
should be the enhancement of professional competence and academic excel-
lence, and not solely the production of skilled manpower for absorption by
the economic sector. As Kasozi (2002: 135) noted: “The delivery of higher
education should not be determined entirely by, and left to, market forces”26.
7. Security of tenure for the teaching staff should be guaranteed and
protected by law. The present system of a contract signed by each staff
member and subject to renewal every two years should be terminated.
8. Links and exchange programmes with African and other universities
are essential for the maintenance of academic standards and the utilisation
of external expertise, for the enrichment of teaching and research, and for
the further expansion and development of higher education in general and
the University in particular.
A Glimpse into the Academic Life of Instructors
The members of the teaching staff of the University have multiple duties,
obligations and responsibilities that they are expected to carry out within
a fixed time framework based on the official academic calendar: giving
lectures, setting and invigilating mid-semester and final examinations, mark-
ing answer papers and other written assignments, and submitting the gra-
des. There are several programmes which run simultaneously, overlap and
even clash: regular day, evening, summer and post-graduate, the last fast
expanding at a pace that is over-stretching existing and limited manpower
and financial resources. The instructors also prepare lecture notes and tea-
ching materials, work on the revision of the curricula, advise students and
supervise the writing and evaluation of student research papers. Periodic—
and sometimes prolonged—disruption of academic work (in times of crisis)
and the multiplicity of official holidays and religious festivals reduce the
duration of contact hours in the classrooms. Over the last three or so years,
the second semester has had to be extended well into the summer because
26. See also SETARGEW (2003: 47 ff.).
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the freshman programme started and ended later than the regular pro-
gramme. There is therefore little or no time for the teaching staff to engage
in research work, publish articles, or to write papers for conferences, causing
a long delay in promotion. More importantly, they cannot cover the courses
in time with negative implications for the professional competence of the
students. The desperate attempt to salvage the situation by organizing
makeup classes on weekends and weekdays is frustrated by the shortage of
classrooms and facilities, not to speak of the reluctance of students to come
for the lectures under various pretexts, the genuineness of which is difficult,
if not impossible, to establish.
Student nagging of instructors for grades is a permanent cause of irrita-
tion that sometimes leads to acrimonious arguments and confrontation. It
takes different forms: a polite plea for remarking of exam papers and a
request for additional points by presenting personal excuses (illness at the
time of the exam, death in the family and the risk of academic dismissal).
The most desperate and aggressive ones leave a note threatening the lectur-
ers, or verbally abuse and physically assault them.
Although pedagogically, it has its merits, the ruling introduced lately
that obliges instructors to show corrected exam papers and grading scale
to students even before grades are submitted has already faced a major
practical problem: that of implementation due to the large number of stu-
dents. It has also been abused by even those with better performance.
Besides, the whole exercise has been time-consuming and highly emotion-
ally charged, and has cast doubt on the moral integrity and professional
competence of the instructors. In response the departments turned to larg-
ely objective questions, since there can be no argument about whether the
answers to these are correct or incorrect. Pedagogically, objective exams
do not test the power of the students’ critical analysis, evaluation and inter-
pretation of knowledge but mainly their ability for memorizing factual infor-
mation, thus hampering the development of their skill in the writing and
presenting of research papers.
Maintaining classroom discipline has also been a frustrating exercise.
Some students are regularly absent and arrive late for lectures and engage
in conversation in class. The instructor who tries to impose strict classroom
discipline, takes regular attendance and is not lenient while marking exam
papers is often the object of gossiping and sometimes a victim of deliberate
under-evaluation of his performance by students, with the latter counting
against his academic promotion. There have naturally been cases of staff
dereliction, corruption, irresponsibility and negligence towards their duties,
with negative consequences for the teaching-and-learning process.
The details of these and many other exceptional and occasional irregular-
ities are too well known to require specific examples and documentation.
It must, of course, be remembered that there are also a great many students
who are conscientious, well-mannered, highly disciplined and diligent, and
respectful towards their teachers. Teaching and advising them on academic
308 HUSSEIN AHMED
matters has always been a source of pride and inspiration. They have the
potential of becoming the successors of the present generation of academics
and University leaders.
Department of History, Addis Ababa University.
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ABSTRACT
Established in 1950 on the initiative of the imperial government, the colleges consti-
tuting the University College of Addis Ababa (UCAA) were integrated in 1962 to form
the Haile Sellassie I University (HSIU), later to be called Addis Ababa University (AAU).
Throughout the 1970s (except 1974-1976), and especially in the 1980s, AAU
expanded and diversified its academic programmes and the number of students rose
dramatically despite the limited, and even stunted, growth in infrastructure, budgetary
allocation and facilities. The rise, development and impact of the student movement
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put HSIU/AAU under the national spotlight, gave an impetus to the process of the politi-
cal and economic transformation of the country, and provided the ideological justifi-
cation for, and direction of, that process from 1974 to the end of the century and
beyond. The three Ethiopian regimes and the University (and high schools) students
had differing—and often opposing—perceptions on, and attitudes towards, each
other’s position on important issues, based on political and ideological considerations
and strategies. The study identifies the sources for some of the major constraints
facing the University, and suggests ways of overcoming them. Despite the limited
scope of the paper and the tentativeness of the conclusions, the broad themes and
issues raised can provide the basis for further studies on the role, mission and challen-
ges facing institutions of higher education in the twenty-first century.
RÉSUMÉ
L’Université d’Addis-Abeba. Cinquante-trois ans d’existence : une vue de l’intérieur.
— Établis en 1950 à l’initiative du gouvernement impérial, les différents collèges qui
constituaient le University College of Addis Ababa (UCAA) ont été intégrés en 1962
pour former la Haile Sellassie I University (HSIU), plus tard renommée Addis Ababa
University (AAU). Dans les années 1970 (sauf de 1974 à 1976) et surtout dans les
années 1980, l’AAU a étendu et diversifié ses programmes universitaires, et a vu le
nombre de ses étudiants augmenter sensiblement en dépit des ressources insuffisantes
et des faibles infrastructures. La montée en puissance et l’impact du mouvement
étudiant a non seulement attiré l’attention de la nation sur la HSIU/AAU, mais a égale-
ment donné de l’élan au processus de transformation économique et politique du
pays. Le mouvement étudiant a, par ailleurs, fourni la justification idéologique et
guidé la direction de ce processus de 1974 à la fin du siècle et au-delà. En fonction
de leurs considérations et stratégies idéologiques, les trois régimes éthiopiens et
les étudiants (et lycéens) avaient des conceptions et des attitudes différentes, voire
opposées, sur les questions importantes. Cette étude identifie l’origine de quelques
contraintes auxquelles l’Université fait face actuellement et suggère quelques manières
de les surmonter. En dépit de la portée limitée de cet article et de l’aspect hypothé-
tique de ses conclusions, les questions abordées ici peuvent offrir une base à de
futures recherches sur le rôle et la mission des institutions d’enseignement supérieur
au XXIe siècle ainsi que les défis auxquels elles sont confrontées.
Keywords/Mots-clés: Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, University, background and develop-
ment, constraints, relations with the academic staff and the state, the student move-
ment 1960-2001/Éthiopie, université d’Addis-Abeba, développement, enseignants,
mouvements étudiants.
